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Abstract 
 We tested whether individuals can exert control over the expression of attitudinal 
ambivalence and if this control is exerted with self-presentational concerns. Using the self-
presentation paradigm, participants reported more ambivalence about Genetically Modified 
Organisms ("GMO") in a standard and a self-enhancement (present yourself positively) 
conditions than in a self-depreciation (present yourself negatively) condition, on both felt 
(Experiments 1a and 2a) and potential ambivalence, in its cognitive (Experiments 1b and 2b) 
and affective components (Experiments 1b and 2c). The role of ambivalent attitudes in 
conveying a positive social value was confirmed by the fact that the above effect was found 
on a controversial attitude object (GMOs) but the opposite appeared on a non-controversial 
one (e.g. tooth brushing, a truism; Experiment 3). Such a reversal was obtained by directly 
manipulating the perception of controversy on GMOs (Experiment 4). Attitudinal 
ambivalence may thus serve an adaptive function, i.e. achieving a positive social value. 
 Keywords: ambivalence, attitudes, social value, self-presentation, controversy. 
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The Social Value of Being Ambivalent: 
Self-Presentational Concerns in the Expression of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
 In September 2012, a wave of debate on the safety of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) flooded most media when a scientific study showed that a variety of GMO corn 
produced by an international food company increased cancer rate in mice. The findings were 
immediately compared with other scientific studies showing no impact of GMO on human 
and animal health (e.g. Peeples, 2012), leaving the public wondering whether in front of such 
a complex matter one should be in favor or against GMOs. We are frequently asked to 
express our opinion on various subjects in our everyday life, and it can appear in some cases 
that we hold simultaneously both positive and negative views on the debated topic. For 
example, one can be against genetically modified food because it could have disastrous 
consequences for the environment, but also in favor because it could help feeding people in 
need (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006). This phenomenon has been referred to as attitudinal 
ambivalence (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). Interestingly, ambivalent attitudes have 
traditionally been treated as weak forms of attitude, and described as being malleable and 
influenced by persuasive communication (Armitage & Conner, 2000), as well as by consensus 
information (Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001) or interpersonal influence (Zemborain & Johar, 
2007). However, more recent research (e.g. Cavazza & Butera, 2008) has questioned this 
view by indicating that ambivalent individuals only change their attitude at a manifest level 
when facing a persuasive message, but not at a more latent level. 
 Thus, the question that still remains unanswered in the literature on attitudinal 
ambivalence is whether ambivalent attitudes are weaker, more malleable attitudes, or attitudes 
that have a specific function. Indeed, the debate has mainly revolved around the question of 
the weaknesses of attitudinal ambivalence, and has failed to ask and systematically study the 
question of its function. In this article, we aim at contributing to this debate in two 
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complementary ways. Firstly, in order to address the question of what the function of 
attitudinal ambivalence might be, we adopted a self-presentational approach by contending 
that attitudinal ambivalence is an adaptive self-regulatory device and proposing the 
hypotheses that, if this contention is true, it should be possible to show that (a) individuals can 
exert some control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence and that (b) this control is 
exerted with self-presentational purposes, namely displaying a positive social value. 
Secondly, this research will also propose and test the process that might be responsible for the 
hypothesized effects, by showing that (c) attitudinal ambivalence may convey positive social 
value in that it may communicate that one has thoughtfully pondered the issue, and should 
therefore be expressed for self-presentational purposes on controversial attitude objects but 
not on non-controversial attitude objects.  
The Functions of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
 Notwithstanding the vast literature on attitudinal ambivalence, some authors have 
pointed to the need for additional research that would directly address the functions fulfilled 
by ambivalent attitudes (Costarelli, 2011; Maio & Olson, 2000). Indeed, the studies conducted 
with this aim led to diverging conclusions as to the function of attitudinal ambivalence. The 
most consensual conclusions focused on the consequences of ambivalence, more specifically 
on the weakness of ambivalent attitudes in comparison with univalent attitudes, mainly 
because the former is less likely to predict intentions or further behaviors than the latter (see 
Armitage & Conner, 2004 for a review). Several studies reported indeed that being 
ambivalent weakens the link between attitude and behavior (e.g. Armitage, 2003; Conner, 
Povey, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, 2003; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004), as well as 
between attitude and intentions (Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001). 
Moreover, it has been recently discussed that ambivalent individuals feel discomfort in 
decision-making situations (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 
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2009; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009). In sum, the majority of the studies 
available in the literature portray attitudinal ambivalence as a weak form of attitude. 
However, some researchers reported results indicating that attitudinal ambivalence 
could serve an adaptive function. For example, ambivalence was found to be related with a 
strong desire to quit smoking (Lipkus, Pollak, McBride, Schwartz-Bloom, Lyna, & Bloom, 
2005). In a similar vein, Fong (2006) has shown that inducing ambivalent emotions (i.e. 
sadness and happiness) helped the participants being creative. In a nutshell, even if 
ambivalent attitudes are a widespread phenomenon (Breckler, 2004), it has been noted that 
little is known about the antecedents of ambivalence (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005; Keele & 
Wolak, 2008).  
It is worth noting, in this respect, that some personality-based factors, also named top-
down processes by Conner and Armitage (2008; e.g. Need for Cognition, Personal Fear of 
Invalidity), have been reported to be associated with more or less ambivalence (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). Moreover, specific contexts (or 
bottom-up processes, Conner & Armitage, 2008) have been reported as leading individuals to 
be more or less ambivalent, as for example interpersonal discrepancy (Priester & Petty, 2001) 
or the anticipation of conflicting situations (Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007). However, 
notwithstanding the importance of the above research, the motivational conflicts underlying 
the expression of attitudinal ambivalence still need to be clarified, as suggested by Crano and 
Prislin (2006). In this article, we aim for the first time at directly investigating how 
ambivalence can be used to present oneself as a function of the pressures of one’s social 
environment. 
This is the first original contribution of the present research. Indeed, to the best of our 
knowledge, only two articles reported research specifically aimed at investigating the 
influence of social norms on attitudinal ambivalence. However, both of these studies did so 
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indirectly, and did not use a manipulation that allows to directly identify self-presentational 
concerns. Mucchi-Faina, Pacilli, Pagliaro and Alparone (2009) reported that individuals 
indicated less ambivalence toward an out-group (e.g. the elderly) when this out-group was 
protected by the fairness norm in comparison with a less protected group (e.g. the adults). 
Cavazza and Butera (2008) have shown in a study on persuasion that ambivalent participants 
could act strategically when facing a persuasive message. Their ambivalent participants 
changed attitude and agreed with the attitude of the majority at a direct level more than 
univalent participants, sustaining that ambivalent individuals can be influenced to a higher 
extent than univalent individuals. More interestingly, however, Cavazza and Butera (2008) 
also observed that unlike univalent participants, ambivalent participants maintained their 
initial attitude at an indirect level (where the link between attitudes and the source’s message 
was less salient). Thus, ambivalent participants seemed to be able to adapt themselves to the 
persuasive pressure of the majority and to strategically control the expression of their attitude, 
without really changing it.  
The above research raises the question of why one would express ambivalence in 
order to achieve a positive self-presentation. The answer to this question represents our 
second contribution. There is evidence that such a controlled expression of ambivalence may 
depend on the consensus attached to an attitude object. Green, Visser and Tetlock (2000) 
reported that individuals who were accountable to conflicting points of view toward the free 
fair trade issue (a topic on which there is no obvious solution according to these researchers) 
were the most integratively complex (i.e. more ambivalent) in comparison with individuals 
accountable to unified point of views. Furthermore, the idea of a link between controversy 
and ambivalence is suggested by Zhao and Capella (2008). Speaking about marijuana (a 
highly controversial drug in the United States), these authors evoked that the high ratio of 
ambivalent adolescents toward this drug could result from heated debates and consequently 
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from a lot of conflicting information over the years about marijuana in society. Likewise, 
Stoeckel (2013) reported that the disagreement among the elites on the attitude towards 
Europe could lead to more ambivalence in the population. However, one can wonder whether 
and to what extent these responses expressed ambivalence or a way to present oneself as 
ambivalent.  
Hence, in line with Maio and Haddock (2004, 2010), we believe that expressing an 
ambivalent attitude on controversial attitude objects could be positively valued, whereas this 
should not be the case on non-controversial, consensual ones. These authors, indeed, 
suggested—but did not test—that through ambivalence individuals may give the impression 
of being fair and knowledgeable when the object is controversial (Maio & Haddock, 2010, p. 
42); however, consensual attitude objects are associated with definite social norms, and in this 
case individuals may be more motivated to express clear-cut univalent attitudes. 
Attitudinal Ambivalence and Self-Presentation 
 If it is true that attitudinal ambivalence is adaptive in that it allows to modify one’s 
attitude as a function of the normative pressures of the environment, then it should be 
demonstrated that (a) individuals can exert some control over the expression of attitudinal 
ambivalence and that (b) this control is exerted for self-presentational purposes. To the best of 
our knowledge, such hypotheses have never been tested, probably because research on 
attitudinal ambivalence has historically focused on its weakness and not on its function, as 
noted above. In this respect, these hypotheses represent an important contribution to the 
literature on attitudinal ambivalence, in that they would represent a critical test of the 
existence of a strategic component in attitudinal ambivalence.  
How to test these hypotheses? The “self-presentation paradigm”, designed by Jellison 
and Green (1981) appears to be the perfect tool for this purpose, and indeed it has been 
developed to make it possible to uncover the presence of specific intentions in the expression 
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of attitudes. In order to test whether individuals are able to strategically manipulate the 
expression of an attitude with self-presentational intentions, Jellison and Green (1981) asked 
their participants to answer an attitude scale either in such a way as to be positively evaluated 
by a fictitious reader (self-enhancement) or in such a way as to be negatively evaluated (self-
depreciation). Thus, the experimental protocol consists of a set of blatant instructions that 
directly ask individuals to voluntarily and strategically modulate their answers (Gilibert & 
Cambon, 2003). The rationale behind this method is that if the attitude score in the self-
enhancement condition is significantly different from that in the self-depreciation condition, 
this means that the respondents know the social norms that regulate the expression of that 
attitude and they can deliberately adapt their answers to be positively (or negatively) 
evaluated. The self-presentation paradigm has been successfully used in several studies to 
detect people’s awareness of various social norms (e.g. the norm of internality, Dubois & 
Beauvois, 2005; Jellison & Green, 1981; the norm of consistency; Jouffre, Py, & Somat, 
2001). This paradigm was also used to identify the components put forward for self-
presentation purposes in the endorsement of several constructs (e.g. achievement goals, 
Darnon, Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & Butera, 2009; comparative optimism, Tyler & Rosier, 
2009). Thus, the self-presentation paradigm allows to test our first hypothesis that (a) 
individuals can exert some control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence: If this is 
true, then individuals asked to answer an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to 
present themselves positively (self-enhancement) should display a different level of attitudinal 
ambivalence in comparison with a situation in which they have to present themselves 
negatively (self-depreciation condition).  
 Another important property of the self-presentation paradigm is that it allows to test 
whether by default people are motivated by self-presentational concerns when answering a 
given questionnaire (see Gilibert & Cambon, 2003 for a discussion of this aspect). Indeed, in 
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a study on the ability of respondents to detect a social norm, Bressoux and Pansu (2007) have 
shown that the standard measure (respondents answer without specific instruction) and the 
pro-normative one (self-enhancement) are more strongly correlated than are standard and 
counter-normative (self-depreciation), suggesting that by default people try to obtain positive 
evaluations when answering a questionnaire. Thus, the self-presentation paradigm allows to 
test at the same time our second hypothesis that (b) the control over the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence is exerted for self-presentational purposes: If this is true, then 
individuals should display a different level of attitudinal ambivalence when asked to answer 
an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively (self-
depreciation condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to present 
themselves positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure without specific instructions (standard). 
 The third hypothesis aims at providing an explanation of the predicted strategic change 
in level of ambivalence, thereby providing an indication as to the direction of the attitude shift 
as a function of the self-presentation conditions. We propose that (c) attitudinal ambivalence 
may be used to convey a positive image of oneself, because—as mentioned above—it may 
imply a form of thoughtful reflection, a balanced view of the issue at hand that shows that one 
is considering both positive and negative aspects. If this is true, individuals should present 
themselves as more ambivalent in order to present themselves positively only when the 
attitude object is controversial, and not when the attitude object is not controversial, as this is 
a situation in which a balanced view may signal that the individual is considering the 
complexity of the issue. As a consequence, it is when the attitude object is controversial that 
individuals are expected to report less ambivalence when asked to answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively (self-depreciation 
condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to present themselves 
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positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an attitudinal ambivalence 
measure without specific instructions (standard). Interestingly, this idea is supported by an 
insightful comment formulated some years ago by Maio and Haddock: “It is possible that 
social norms make it occasionally desirable to have high ambivalence in an attitude, such as 
when an issue is controversial” (2004. p.435). When the attitude object is non-controversial, a 
positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a clear-cut pro-normative attitude 
(either positive or negative, as a function of the consensus). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this insight has never been put to the test.  
 Overview 
 The hypotheses are tested in four series of experiments on two different measures of 
attitudinal ambivalence. Firstly, ambivalence can be tapped through a measure of subjective 
ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996), also named “felt ambivalence”(Newby-Clark et al., 
2002). This measure requires the participants to indicate to what extent they hold conflicting 
evaluations toward a specific issue. Secondly, ambivalent attitudes can be assessed indirectly 
in order to measure a “potential ambivalence”, by assessing the positive and negative 
components of the attitude separately. For example, the method selected for the present 
research uses an open-ended measure (Bell, Esses, & Maio, 1996), and asks the respondents 
first to write down a list of adjectives (cognitive component) or emotions (affective 
component) related to the topic of interest, and then to attribute a valence to each written 
adjective or emotion from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive), as explained in 
detailed in the method section. As there is no consensus in the literature on the most effective 
way to measure attitudinal ambivalence (Conner & Armitage, 2008; Conner & Sparks, 2002), 
we used both measures in our experiments.  
 In order to test our hypotheses, we needed a controversial attitude object and a non-
controversial one. We selected genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as our controversial 
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attitude object. First, Gaskell and his colleagues reported that Europeans were quite 
ambivalent about GMOs and biotechnologies (see Gaskell, 1997; Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, & 
Allum, 1999) and several previous studies on ambivalence used this attitude object (e.g. 
Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, 
Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004). Secondly, even if the production and commercialization of 
GMOs began in 1994, controversies about genetically modified organisms are still quite vivid 
and frequent (e.g., Peeples, 2012). As a non-controversial attitude object, we decided to use a 
truism, an issue on which there is such a consensus that there is no need to debate (here, tooth 
brushing; McGuire, 1961). Experiments 1 and 2 used the controversial attitude object and 
Experiments 3 the non-controversial one. Experiment 4 directly manipulated the perception of 
controversy versus consensus on the same attitude object (GMOs).  
Pilot Study 
 Participants and Method. In all, 121 students of a medium-size Swiss university 
volunteered in this pilot study ran on the Internet with LimeSurvey. To ensure that the 
participants' perception of both attitude objects was in line with the literature, participants 
were asked to indicate their perception of controversy or consensus toward several attitude 
objects, among which tooth brushing and GMOs. More precisely, they were asked to fill three 
7-point bipolar scales devised for this pilot study, for each attitude object. The first bipolar 
scale ranged from 1 (consensus) to 7 (controversy), the second from 1 (no debate) to 7 
(debate), and the third from 1 (a mutual agreement) to 7 (a polemic disagreement). The 
Cronbach’s alpha was α = .84 for GMOs and α = .89 for tooth brushing; therefore, we 
computed the mean of the answers provided on the three items. The range of the scale varies 
from 1 (perception of consensus) to 7 (perception of controversy). 
 Results and Discussion. To test our hypothesis according to which GMOs should be 
perceived as controversial and tooth brushing as consensual, we conducted t-test analyses 
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against the mid-point of the scale (i.e. 4). The two t-tests supported our hypotheses: GMOs 
were indeed clearly evaluated as being controversial (M = 5.26), t(120) = 11.76, p <  .001, η2 p 
= .53, and tooth brushing as consensual (M = 1.34), t(120) = -39.33, p < .001, η2 p = .93. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants and design. This experiment has been conducted on the Internet using 
LimeSurvey. The students of a medium-size Swiss university have been solicited by an e-mail 
presenting the experiment as a survey on genetically modified food. Five hundred and twenty 
three participants took part on a voluntary basis. The sample of Experiment 1a consisted of 
244 females and 128 males; the mean age was 23.87 years (SD = 4.92). The sample of 
Experiment 1b comprised one hundred and fifty one participants; two participants were 
dropped from the analysis because of uncommon studentized deleted residuals (Judd & 
McClelland, 1989). The final sample consisted of 98 females and 51 males; the mean age was 
23.54 years (SD = 4.74). Preliminary analyses revealed that sex and age had no impact on the 
studied effects, all ps > .10; thus, age and sex were not included in the reported analyses. As 
this is true for all the other experiments, this information will not be repeated. The self-
presentation conditions were set as a within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, 
Self-Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. In Experiment 1a, participants were asked to complete the 
three items used in Priester and Petty’s (1996) research to assess felt ambivalence (for 
example, “to what extent do you hold an indecisive attitude toward GMOs”), adapted in 
French, on a 7-point Likert scale. In Experiment 1b, the participants had to write the 
adjectives coming to their mind when thinking about genetically modified food (max. 10) in a 
standard condition. Once the list was completed, they had to attribute a score ranging from -3 
(extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive) to each adjective of the list, according to their 
ATTITUDINAL AMBIVALENCE AND SELF-PRESENTATION 13 
perception of those adjectives (for example “dangerous” would be coded as -3, while 
“awesome” would be coded as +3), as in the method set forth by Bell et al. (1996). They were 
then asked to write down emotions coming to their mind when thinking about genetically 
modified food (max. 10) as in Bell et al. (1996). 
 For both experiments, participants first responded in a standard condition, that is 
without any specific instruction. They were then asked to do it again in order to be positively 
evaluated by a teacher (self-enhancement condition). We used the same instructions as 
Darnon et al. (2009) and told them “As you fill in the following questionnaire we would like 
you to try to generate a good image of yourself, that is, to answer in such a way as to be 
judged in a positive way by your teachers. More specifically, as you indicate your level of 
agreement with each of the following propositions, you should be trying to generate a good 
image of yourself”. Finally, they followed the process in a self-depreciation condition. The 
same instructions as the above one were used except for the words good and positive 
respectively replaced by bad and negative. The standard condition was always presented as 
first; the order of self-depreciation and self-enhancement instructions was counterbalanced. 
The order of presentation did not yield any significant effect, ps > .05, and it has not been 
included in further analyses, either in these or in the other experiments. 
 Measures. The score of felt ambivalence (Experiment 1a) was computed by averaging 
the score of the 3 items. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .69 for the standard condition, α = .72 
for the self-enhancement condition and α = .69 for the self-depreciation condition. Two 
scores of potential ambivalence (both cognitive and affective; Experiment 1b) have been 
computed using the following formula (Bell et al., 1996): attitudinal ambivalence = P + N – 2 
| P – N | + k. In this formula, P represents the value of the positive dimension score, N the 
absolute value of the negative dimension score and k is a constant added to preclude negative 
ambivalence scores for both the adjectives and the emotions (here, k = 30). Thus, the score of 
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ambivalence ranges from 0 (extremely univalent) from 90 (extremely ambivalent). However, 
in order to facilitate the readability of Tables 1 and 2 reporting five experiments on GMOs, 
we transformed the mean score in each experiment by computing the Percentage Of 
Maximum Possible score (POMP; Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). POMP = [(observed 
- minimum)/(maximum - minimum)] × 100, where observed refers to the observed score for a 
single participant and minimum (maximum) refers to the minimum (maximum) possible score 
on the scale. Thus, regardless of the measure, the score of ambivalence ranged from 0 
(extremely univalent) to 100 (extremely ambivalent). Potential cognitive ambivalence and 
potential affective ambivalence were significantly correlated, r  = .372, p < .001. Despite this 
correlation, we separately treated these two variables as they relate to different components of 
ambivalence (see Mucchi-Faina et al., 2009).  
Results  
 To test our hypotheses that (a) individuals can exert some control over the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence and that (b) this control is exerted with self-presentational concerns, 
we should find that both the self-enhancement and standard condition should elicit a different 
level of ambivalence than the self-depreciation condition. To test this effect, we designed a 
within-participant planned contrast whereby the score in the self-depreciation condition (2) 
has been tested against both the score in the standard condition (-1) and the score in the self-
enhancement condition (-1) following the approach proposed by Furr & Rosenthal (2003). 
Moreover, the score in the standard condition (1) was tested against the score in the self-
enhancement condition (-1) in an orthogonal contrast; the score in the self-depreciation 
condition was set as 0. Results of Experiment 1a and 1b are reported in Table 1. The proper 
use of contrast analysis requires the planned contrast testing the hypothesis to be significant 
and the orthogonal contrast testing the residual to be non-significant (Judd & McClelland, 
1989).  
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 Experiment 1a: Felt ambivalence. The test of the planned contrast supported the 
hypotheses, F(1,371) = 9.84, p = .002, η2 p = .026. Participants reported significantly more 
ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was not-significant, F(1, 371) < 1, p > .05. 
 Experiment 1b. 
 Potential cognitive ambivalence. Considering the cognitive component of the potential 
ambivalence, the same planned contrast as in Experiment 1a reached significance, F(1,148) = 
14.52, p < .001, η2 p = .09. Participants reported more ambivalence in the standard condition 
and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal 
contrast was not significant, F(1, 148) = 3.08, p > .05.  
 Potential affective ambivalence. We replicated the above effects considering the 
affective component of the potential ambivalence. Participants reported more ambivalent 
attitudes in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition, F(1,148) = 17.77, p < .001, η2 p = .11. The orthogonal contrast was not 
significant F (1, 148) < 1, p >.05.  
Discussion  
 These two experiments have been designed to test that individuals can exert some 
control over the expression of attitudinal ambivalence and that this control is exerted with 
self-presentational concerns (hypotheses a and b). Consistently with these hypotheses, 
contrast analyses indicated in both experiments that participants reported significantly more 
ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-
depreciation condition. The hypotheses received support with both the measure of “felt 
ambivalence” (Experiment 1a) and the measure of “potential ambivalence” (Experiment 1b, 
with both adjectives and emotions).  
 One might argue that an important limitation of this experiment is the use of an Internet-
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based questionnaire. Indeed, several scholars questioned the replicability of studies ran on the 
Internet in comparison with paper-and-pencil studies (Joinson, 1999; Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004). In order to assess whether the present results are method-
dependent, we ran the same experiments using a paper-and-pencil paradigm, within the more 
controlled environment of lab cubicles. To avoid the mutual influences in the expression of 
affective and cognitive ambivalence, we separated these two components in two distinct 
experiments (2b and 2c).  
Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants and design. This experiment took place at the end of a course. Forty-five 
first-year Psychology students enrolled in a medium-size Swiss university volunteered in 
Experiment 2a. Thirty-four women and 9 men constitute the sample with a mean age of 21.91 
years (SD = 5.92). Two participants did not indicate their sex and age. Twenty women and 7 
men participated in Experiment 2b with a mean age of 21.96 years (SD = 6.31). One 
participant did not indicate his sex and age. Twenty-five women and 6 men volunteered in 
Experiment 2c with a mean age of 21.42 years (SD = 4.56). Two participants did not indicate 
their sex and age. The self-presentation conditions were set as a within-participants variable 
with three levels: Standard, Self-Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. Participants of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c were asked to 
complete the same steps as in Experiment 1. However, participants of Experiment 2b only 
reported adjectives associated with GMOs and the ones of Experiment 2c only reported 
emotions. The control condition was always presented first followed by the self-depreciation 
and self-enhancement conditions, which were counterbalanced. 
 Measure. The index of felt ambivalence (Experiment 2a) was computed by averaging 
the score on the same 3 items as in Experiment 1a. The Cronbach’s alpha was α = .78 for the 
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standard condition, α = .69 for the self-enhancement condition and α = .61 for the self-
depreciation condition. A score of potential ambivalence (potential cognitive ambivalence in 
Experiment 2b; potential affective ambivalence in Experiment 2c) has been computed using 
the Bell et al. ‘s formula (Bell et al., 1996) as for Experiment 1b. We again transformed and 
computed the percentage of maximum possible (POMP).   
Results 
 Results of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c are reported in Table 2.  
 Experiment 2a: Felt ambivalence. The test of the planned contrast corresponding to 
our hypothesis yielded a significant effect, F(1, 44) = 4.89, p = .032, η2 p = .10. Once again, 
participants reported significantly more ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-
enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was 
not significant, F(1, 44) = 2.56, p > .05. 
 Experiment 2b: Potential Cognitive ambivalence. The test of the planned contrast 
corresponding to the hypothesis reached significance, F(1, 27) = 17.69, p < .001, η2 p = .39. 
Participants reported more ambivalent attitudes in the standard condition and in the self-
enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was 
not significant, F(1, 27) = 2.57,  p > .05.  
 Experiment 2c: Potential Affective ambivalence. The planned contrast corresponding 
to the hypotheses was significant, F(1, 32) = 7.47, p = .01, η2 p =  .19. Participants reported 
more ambivalence in the standard condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the 
self-depreciation condition. The orthogonal contrast was not significant, F(1, 32) = 2.88, p > 
.05. 
Discussion  
 The results of Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c amounted to a full replication of Experiments 
1a and 1b. Indeed, across our three paper-and pencil experiments, carried out in lab cubicles, 
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contrast analyses revealed that participants reported significantly more ambivalence in the 
standard and in the self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition. The 
hypotheses received support with the measure of “felt ambivalence” (Experiment 2a), and the 
measure of “potential ambivalence”, with both adjectives (Experiment 2b) and emotions 
(Experiment 2c).  
 We hypothesized that such results should only be observed on controversial attitude 
objects, as such objects require considering the diversity of their aspects. A consequence of 
this reasoning, and the basis for hypothesis (c), is that when the attitude object is non-
controversial, attitudinal ambivalence is useless in terms of self-presentational purposes, and a 
positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a clear-cut attitude. Two 
experiments have been carried out to test this hypothesis. The first, experiment 3, uses tooth 
brushing as the attitude object; as tooth brushing is a truism, a totally consensual attitude 
object according to our pilot study and McGuire’s (1961) work, everybody is expected to hold 
the same attitude. Thus, in order to generate a positive self-image, participants should express 
a clear-cut attitude, which should results in participants reporting lower level of ambivalence 
in the standard and self-enhancement conditions, as compared with the self-depreciation 
condition. The second test comes from experiment 4, that directly tests hypothesis (c) by 
manipulating the perception of controversy versus consensus within the same experiment and 
with the same attitude object (GMOs). If the above reasoning is correct, we should find higher 
levels of ambivalence in the standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-
depreciation condition when the instructions tell the participants that there is some 
controversy on the issue (as in experiments 1 and 2), and lower levels of ambivalence in the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition when the 
instructions tell the participants that there is consensus (as in experiment 3). Experiment 3 
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uses a felt ambivalence measure and experiment 4 a potential ambivalence measure (in its 
cognitive component). 
Experiment 3 
 From an operational point of view, in this experiment using a measure of felt 
ambivalence, we predict that participants should present themselves as less ambivalent in both 
a standard and a self-enhancement situation than in a self-depreciation condition. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Twenty-seven first-year Psychology students enrolled in a 
medium-size Swiss university volunteered in this experiment at the end of a course. Twenty 
women and 4 men constitute the sample with a mean age of 22.38 years (SD = 5.55). Three 
participants did not indicate their sex and age. The self-presentation conditions were set as a 
within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, Self-Enhancement and Self-
Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. Participants were asked to complete the same steps as in 
Experiments 1a and 2a. The control condition was always presented first followed by the self-
depreciation and self-enhancement conditions, which were counterbalanced.  
 Measure. The index of felt ambivalence was computed by averaging the score on the 3 
items (α = .78 for the standard condition, α = .85 for the self-enhancement condition and α = 
.81 for the self-depreciation condition). We computed the percentage of maximum possible 
(POMP) as for the previous experiments.   
Results 
 Results of Experiment 3 are reported in Table 3. The test of the planned contrast 
corresponding to our hypothesis yielded a significant effect, F(1, 26) = 107.15, p < .001, η2 p 
= .80. As predicted, participants reported significantly less ambivalence in the standard 
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condition and in the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition. The 
orthogonal contrast was not significant, F(1, 26) < 1, p > .05. 
Discussion  
 These results complement those of experiments 1 and 2 to support our hypothesis that 
attitudinal ambivalence is used for self-presentational purposes by increasing the level of 
reported ambivalence when the attitude object is controversial, and lowering it when the 
attitude object is not controversial. In Experiment 3, indeed, with a felt ambivalence measure, 
participants presented themselves as holding a less ambivalent attitude when asked to present 
themselves in the standard and in the self-enhancement conditions, as compared with the self-
depreciation condition. Although these results are clear-cut, and the pilot study has clearly 
indicated the profound difference in level of controversy between GMOs and tooth brushing, 
support to hypothesis 3 comes from the comparison of the effects obtained in separate 
experiments (reversed effects in experiment 3 as compared with experiments 1 and 2). To 
ensure that individuals use ambivalence to display a positive image of themselves when there 
is a controversy and not when there is a consensus, the perception of controversy or consensus 
needs to be directly manipulated rather than being inferred through the use of different 
attitude objects. Experiment 4 was designed for this purpose.    
Experiment 4 
 From an operational point of view, we predict higher levels of ambivalence in the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition when the 
instructions tell the participants that there is some controversy on the issue, and lower levels 
of ambivalence in the standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation 
condition when the instructions tell the participants that there is consensus. 
Method 
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 Participants and design. Sixty-one students enrolled in a medium-size Swiss 
university volunteered in this experiment at the end of a course. Six participants have been 
excluded from the analyses, for noncompliance to the instructions (they disregarded the self-
presentation conditions). Forty-two women and 13 men thus constituted the sample with a 
mean age of 21.46 years (SD = 4.95). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions (either the consensus or the controversy condition) that were set as a 
between-participants variable (respectively, 25 and 30 participants). The self-presentation 
conditions were set as a within-participants variable with three levels: Standard, Self-
Enhancement and Self-Depreciation. 
 Procedure and materials. In the consensus condition, we presented GMOs as an 
attitude object that does not lead to any controversy, that is not really debated as most 
individuals reported being against GMOs. Below this explanation, a graph was displayed in 
order to reinforce the manipulation. This bogus graph, entitled the "representation of the 
attitude of the Swiss towards GMOs" presented 89% of the Swiss against, and 11% in favor 
of GMOs. In the controversy condition, GMOs were introduced as a controversial attitude 
object that is really debated, as there are almost as many individuals who are in favor of 
GMOs as individuals who are against it. Below, a bogus graph entitled as before presented 
51% of the Swiss against and 49% in favor of GMOs.  
 Because of time constraints, participants were asked to report the adjectives they 
associate with GMOs by selecting them from a list of ten positive and ten negative adjectives 
(cf. Cavazza & Butera, 2008). We selected the 10 most frequent positive adjectives and the 10 
most frequent negative ones from the ones generated by participants in Experiment 1b. The 
positive adjectives were: improved, promising, innovative, productive, beneficial, healthy, 
required, cost-effective, hardy and scientific; the negative adjectives were: useless, unsure, 
uncontrollable, dangerous, harmful, manipulated, worrying, unknown, doubtful and 
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transgenic. 
 Measure. A score of potential cognitive ambivalence has been computed again using 
the Bell et al.’s formula (Bell et al., 1996), transformed into POMP.  
Results and Discussion 
 Results of Experiment 4 are reported in Figure 1. Our prediction was tested via the 
interaction between the experimental condition and the contrast opposing the self-depreciation 
condition (2) against the standard (-1) and the self-enhancement (-1) conditions. This analysis 
resulted in a significant interaction, F(1, 53) = 13.86, p < .001, η2 p = .21. An analysis of 
simple effects revealed that in the controversy condition, participants indeed significantly 
displayed more ambivalence in both the standard (M = 27.52, SD = 12.31) and the self-
enhancement conditions (M = 25.15, SD = 11.83) than in the self-depreciation condition (M = 
19.96, SD = 12.89), F(1, 53) = 10.50, p = .002, η2 p = .16. The orthogonal contrast was not 
significant, F(1, 53) < 1, p > .05. Conversely, participants in the consensus condition 
displayed significantly less ambivalence in both the standard (M = 23.29, SD = 11.69) and the 
self-enhancement conditions (M = 21.24, SD = 12.25) than in the self-depreciation condition 
(M = 26.76, SD = 10.91), F(1, 53) = 4.34, p = .042, η2 p = .07. The orthogonal contrast was 
not significant, F(1, 53) < 1, p >.05. In sum, and in line with hypothesis (c), these results 
show that participants used ambivalence to display a positive image of themselves on a 
controversial attitude object and not when the object was consensual.  
General Discussion 
 Attitudinal ambivalence has long been considered as a weak form of attitude; for the 
first time, the present research investigated the possibility for people to use attitudinal 
ambivalence strategically, with a view to achieving some social value. The seven experiments 
presented in this article have been designed to investigate whether the expression of 
ambivalent attitudes can be controlled and whether this control may have the purpose of 
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achieving a socially valued self-presentation. Furthermore, we extended our reasoning and 
tested the process supposedly responsible of this effect: Ambivalence is used to generate a 
positive self-image when it can be considered as a positive feature, namely to the extent that 
the attitude object is controversial or presented as being controversial.  
 Our first hypothesis predicted that individuals asked to answer an attitudinal 
ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves positively (self-enhancement) 
should display a different level of attitudinal ambivalence in comparison with a situation in 
which they had to present themselves negatively (self-depreciation condition). In other words, 
the expression of attitudinal ambivalence should be controllable, and could be adapted to meet 
relevant social norms (here the demands set forth by the experimenter). The second 
hypothesis predicted that ambivalent attitudes may be used with self-presentational concerns, 
and that therefore individuals should display a different level of ambivalence when asked to 
answer an attitudinal ambivalence measure in such a way as to present themselves negatively 
(self-depreciation condition) in comparison with both a situation in which they have to 
present themselves positively (self-enhancement) and a situation in which they answer an 
attitudinal ambivalence measure without specific instructions (standard). In other words, by 
default individuals would use the expression of ambivalent attitudes as a way to achieve a 
positive self-presentation. Finally, the third hypothesis considers that attitudinal ambivalence 
may be used to convey a positive image of oneself, because it may communicate a balanced 
view of the issue at hand that shows that one is considering both positive and negative 
aspects. If this is true, hypotheses one and two should hold for a controversial attitude object; 
when the attitude object is non-controversial, attitudinal ambivalence is useless in terms of 
self-presentational purposes, and a positive image of oneself is achieved through expressing a 
clear-cut pro-normative attitude. 
 Results supported these three hypotheses. On a controversial attitude object, namely 
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GMOs (Experiments 1 and 2), we observed that individuals indeed reported a higher level of 
ambivalence in the standard and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation 
condition, which supports hypotheses one and two. On a non-controversial attitude object, 
namely tooth brushing (Experiment 3), individuals expressed a less ambivalent attitude in the 
standard and the self-enhancement condition than in the self-depreciation condition: They 
endorsed a more univalent position on the felt ambivalence measure, which indirectly 
supports hypothesis 3. Direct support for this hypothesis comes from Experiment 4, where the 
reversal of effects observed from Experiments 1 and 2 (controversial) to Experiment 3 
(consensual), was replicated within the same experiment by manipulating the alleged 
controversy versus consensus on the same attitude object (GMOs). 
 These results contribute to the literature on attitudinal ambivalence by providing for the 
first time a direct test of the suggestion made by Cavazza and Butera (2008) and Mucchi-
Faina et al. (2009) that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence may have the function of 
meeting salient social norms. The present results, indeed, reveal that the expression of 
attitudinal ambivalence serves the purpose of achieving a positive self-presentation when 
there is a controversy, since both by default (standard) and in order to be positively evaluated 
(self-enhancement), people report a higher level of ambivalence than the one reported in the 
self-depreciation condition. However, when there is a clear consensus on the attitude object, 
ambivalent attitudes are no longer useful for self-presentation, and straightforward pro-
normative attitudes are used instead. In sum, these results contribute to the contention that 
attitudinal ambivalence may serve an adaptive function, as individuals appear to be able to 
strategically control the expression of ambivalence with a view to achieving a valued self-
presentation. This may open the way to several lines of research aiming at uncovering other 
social functions that attitudinal ambivalence may serve. 
 The present results also support the idea of a positive link between heated debates (i.e. 
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controversy) and ambivalence (see Zhao & Capella, 2008; Stoeckel, 2013), as the participants 
of Experiment 4 purposely displayed more ambivalence when they had to express themselves 
to achieve a positive image of themselves on a controversial attitude object. Consequently, it 
seems plausible to think that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence could be socially 
valued when being expressed on such attitude objects. Although displaying a positive image 
of oneself is a fundamental goal in the life of individuals, recent research has shown that 
social value can be achieved through different categories of self-presentational concerns, 
namely social desirability (or warmth) and social utility (or competence; cf. Darnon et al., 
2009; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). If it is true that ambivalence is 
valued in controversial issues—as shown in the present research—because it conveys the 
notion that one is pondering alternative aspects of the same problem, then it should be found 
that ambivalence is valued especially when assessing people’s social utility, as opposed to 
social desirability. Thus, as they are pondering the pros and the cons associated with the 
attitude object, ambivalent individuals could then be evaluated as the most competent ones 
(i.e. the highest on social utility) in comparison with univalent individuals. This is, we 
believe, a promising hypothesis for future research and would represent a new approach of 
ambivalence in the literature.  
 Interestingly, the present results also contribute to the literature on self-presentation. 
Attitudinal ambivalence is traditionally opposed to cognitive consistency (see Gawronski, 
2012), as it results from evaluative inconsistencies (Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). 
Seen through the lens of cognitive consistency, individuals should not put ambivalence 
forward: Indeed, if cognitive consistency is considered as a fundamental need (Festinger, 
1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012), research has also shown that the conditions of its 
expression appeared to be contextual and related to impression-management concerns (e.g., 
Tedeshi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971; Schlenker, 1975). Appearing consistent in the eyes of 
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others was proposed and found to being linked with social value (i.e. as potentially pleasing 
an audience; Baumeister, 1982; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). This research tradition, thus 
suggest that individuals should be less likely to express their ambivalence and even less so to 
present themselves positively. However, if this is most often the case (i.e. when there is a 
consensus on what to think of an attitude object), it might not be the case when controversial 
attitude objects are concerned. Our results indeed show that individuals do display more 
ambivalence to present a positive image of themselves, when the attitude object is 
controversial. This is coherent with the recent literature on inter-group relations showing that 
the expression of ambivalence toward out-groups (e.g. immigrants, a controversial issue) was 
evaluated as being more balanced, realistic and acceptable than univalence (Brauer, Er-Rafiy, 
Kawakami, & Phills, 2012; Costarelli, 2011). Thus, the present research shows that 
consistency is not the only possible response to impression-management concerns, and that 
ambivalence could be used when the issues are complex or controversial. 
 It is important to note that the present results appear to be quite robust as they were 
found in seven experiments that used two different methods (web-based and paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires) and two different measures to assess ambivalence. Indeed, results supported 
our hypotheses when ambivalence was measured with a direct measure (subjective or felt 
ambivalence), as well as when ambivalence was measured with a more indirect measure 
(potential ambivalence). We considered these two different measures of ambivalence as there 
is no consensus in the literature about which one should be preferably used (Conner & 
Armitage, 2008; Conner & Sparks, 2002) even if they are qualitatively different. In line with 
this, our results indicate that, actually, both measures appeared to be permeable to social 
desirability effects, as individuals were able to control the expression of their attitude when 
they reported both their felt and their potential ambivalence. 
 A methodological issue needs to be mentioned. One could argue that setting these 
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experimental conditions as a within-participant variable may have maximized the observed 
difference in the self-enhancement and self-depreciation conditions, in comparison with a 
more natural situation. However, presenting either the self-enhancement or the self-
depreciation condition in first position never had an effect on our planned contrast—the 
effects including order of presentation were always non-significant. Furthermore, the rationale 
behind the self-presentation paradigm (Dubois, 2000; Jellison & Green, 1981) is that when a 
difference is observed precisely in the within-participant comparison between the self-
enhancement condition and the self-depreciation condition, it should be inferred that the 
respondents know the social norms that regulate the expression of that attitude and can 
strategically adapt their answers to be positively (or negatively) evaluated. We observed such 
strategy in all our experiments. 
 Two limitations need to be discussed, as they may open new avenues for research. First, 
these experiments were conducted with university students, and University tends to attribute 
particular value to critical thinking (Guiller, Durndell, & Ross, 2008); as ambivalence 
requires the individual to evaluate both the positive and the negative components of an 
attitude object, ambivalence could indirectly be particularly valued at university. Thus, it 
would be interesting to conduct an experiment similar to the present ones that compares 
students to other samples. Second, only two attitude objects were considered in this paper. 
Thus, it would be interesting for future researches to apply the same reasoning to other 
attitude objects, but also to extend the debate, for example by studying how attitudes can be 
affected when a celebrity or a political figure is targeted by a controversy. Similarly, it would 
be interesting to focus on how inter-personal relationships can be modified as a function of 
polemic disagreements.   
 Notwithstanding these limitations, the present results bring convergent and robust 
support to a view of attitudinal ambivalence as an adaptive mechanism, as they reveal that 
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individuals can control the expression of ambivalence and use it strategically for self-
presentation purposes. After two decades of research that points to its weaknesses and pitfalls, 
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Table 1.     
Mean ambivalence scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the self-
presentation conditions and the type of measure (Experiments 1a and 1b).  
    Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 1a (N = 372):   
Felt Ambivalence 49.09a 48.01a 40.87b 
    (25.94) (30.21) (32.20) 
Experiment 1b (N = 149):   
Potential Cognitive Ambivalence 28.60a 27.04a 24.79b 
  (9.62) (8.47) (9.06) 
     
Potential Affective Ambivalence 30.67a 30.01a 28.02b 
    (7.03) (5.87) (6.73) 
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Table 2.    
Mean ambivalence scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the type of 
measure and the self-presentation conditions (Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c).  
  Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 2a (N = 45):       
Felt Ambivalence 55.06a 45.68a 36.42b 
  (24.90) (30.19) (31.03) 
Experiment 2b (N = 28):    
Potential Cognitive Ambivalence 31.86a 28.73a 23.49b 
  (6.53) (9.26) (7.19) 
Experiment 2c (N = 33):    
Potential Affective Ambivalence 34.24a 31.92a 30.24b 
  (6.46) (8.94) (8.48) 
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Table 3.     
Mean ambivalence scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) as a function of the type of 
measure and the self-presentation conditions (Experiment 3).  
    Self-presentation conditions 
Type of measure Standard Self-Enhancement Self-Depreciation 
Experiment 3 (N = 27):   
Felt Ambivalence 14.20a 10.70a 85.18b 
    (21.14) (21.62) (25.13) 













ATTITUDINAL AMBIVALENCE AND SELF-PRESENTATION 39 
 
 
Figure 1. Level of ambivalence as a function of the self-presentation conditions and the 
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